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DECISION-MAKING IN EXPANDING AMERICAN
URBAN LIFE
JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM*
The purpose of this short paper is to invite attention to metro-
politan problems from the standpoint of decision-making. It is a
modest undertaking designed to provoke inquiry and reflection.
Certainly metropolitan developments on the American scene have
not escaped notice. As a matter of fact, they have been largely sub-
merged under a plethora of written and spoken words. There was a
stage in the consideration of the subject during which discussion did
not wait for inquiry and there seemed to be an almost irresistible
impulse to come quickly to the articulation of solutions. At the well-
planned and conducted National Conference on Metropolitan Prob-
lems, which was held at East Lansing, Michigan, in the spring of
1956, there was no checking the urge to come forward at the end with
solemn conference conclusions.1 This was a largely ephemeral exer-
cise. Since then we have achieved greater restraint. The trend has
been to focus upon particular metropolitan complexes and studies, a
considerable number of which have been undertaken.' There is point
in this: communities differ and this conditions the shaping of a plan
in any particular community. In general terms, however, there is basis
for the comment that the discussions of metropolitanism have grown
a bit stale. Perhaps it can be approached from a fresh perspective.
The immediate suggestion is that an approach be made from the
standpoint of decision-making on public matters of metropolitan
import.
One notes at once that there is a complex of factors, which are
likely to be operative with respect to the determination of a given
matter of public concern in the larger urban context. There is the
public power structure, to which we will address ourselves in the first
instance and in major part. There is the extragovernmental political
power structure in which political leaders exercise primary influence.
Finally, we note the private power structure, which comprehends
various economic and other private groups. These must be taken into
account in examining the situation with respect to the soundness and
adequacy of the arrangements for the political organization of society
viewed in terms of the decision-making function.
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 The report was reproduced in 6 Municipal Law Service Letter 1 (1956).
2 See the listings of metropolitan studies in the current numbers of "'Metropolitan
Area Problems," a publication of the Conference on Metropolitan Area Problems.
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VALUES
We cannot talk effectively about these matters in vacuo; we must
talk to some end. What gives point and direction is that which people
consider important. The deliberate stress here is upon values, that is,
general and abstract ideas which influence action or choice in decision-
making. The basic values of the modern democratic state have recently
been identified as liberty, equality and welfare, supported by second-
ary or instrumental values, which have more definite thrust from the
standpoint of their influence upon decision-making.3
The relation of the democratic value system to the division of
governmental powers and the decision-making process in urban com-
munity life can be illustrated with two or three examples. One of the
familiar instrumental values, associated with the basic value of human
liberty, is the idea that decision-making should be at a level close to
the people and, concomitantly, that public servants should be close to
their masters. This is thought to serve the cause of liberty by protect-
ing against the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority, by having
authority and decision-making close to the people. As the theory
goes, where the opportunity for popular participation and the gaining
of maximum public understanding is greatest the likelihood of arbi-
trariness and imposition is least.
The application of the political value of keeping government close
to the people in contemporary urban life is not easy. If decision-
making is to be had at the level of the smallest appropriate community
unit, we quickly find that some problems of the urban community
have a fairly limited reach; others a more extensive range; and still
others an area-wide scope. One way to meet this would be to devise
special units of government for particular functions and to give each
of those units a scope and a constituency as wide as the functional or
service area. This approach is subject to at least two substantial
objections. As we shall see, it has already been used to a large extent
in the proliferation of ad hoc units of government, but with strong
emphasis upon efficiency and management at the expense of political
representation. In the second place, even if it were attempted to set
up such special function units with politically accountable elected
governing bodies, the system of local government would be made
extremely diffuse and complex. Instead of three levels of government,
there might be any number. Some elaboration is in order as to each
of these objections.
Perhaps we have been too concerned with the business of govern-
ment, with function, with good administration. Certainly this writer,
3 Ylvisaker, "Some Criteria for a 'Proper' Areal Division of Governmental Powers,"
in Area and Power 27, 30 et seq. (Maass ed., 1959).
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as well as others, has stressed the functional ideas that governmental
jurisdiction should be as wide as the service area and that power or
authority should be proportioned to responsibility.' Nor does he back-
water on this. But such ideas do not occupy the whole stage. It
might be that an ad hoc overlay of government for transit purposes,
spanning a metropolitan area, would have much to commend it as a
functional matter. If its governing body were a strictly appointive
board without direct accountability to any constituency, would it be
consistent with the American scheme of political values?5
It is a striking fact of our history that the contemporary prolifera-
tion of appointive ad hoc bodies with jurisdiction in urban life has
kinship to the creation in the latter part of the 19th century of
special commissions and boards, which were given some of the powers
and responsibilities of local government at the expense of the general
function units.' Of course, the legislature often acted directly by
special legislation in that earlier day and politics and corruption had
their roles to play. There is a parallel, however, both in the diffusion
of responsibility in official hands and in the absence of a popular
voice in what goes on. So strong was the reaction against the 19th
century development that the courts in several states gave limited
recognition to a so-called inherent right to local self-government.'
Such extra-constitutional means of limiting legislative power distort
the rational pattern of constitutionalism and they have not had great
vitality. Within the constitutional framework the response has been
limitations on special legislation, home rule provisions and prohibitions
upon legislative granting of municipal powers to special boards and
commissions. 8
Some resort to ad hoc units of government is inescapable. We
cannot do more than move on from where we are. We are compelled
to adapt and experiment while we are on the move. In order to get
the business of government done, we may find it necessary to use ad
hoc arrangements as a short-range matter, even though we presently
have clear ideas as to what should be done as long-range action.
The immediate point, however, is that, recognizing all this, the political
values associated with having governmental authority vested in repre-
4 Fordham, "Local Government in the Larger Scheme of Things," 8 Vand. L. Rev.
667, 668 (1955).
5 Shestack, "The Public Authority," 105 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 552, 568 (1957).
6 See State ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871).
7 State ex rel. Geake v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N.E. 19 (1902); State ex rel.
Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252 (1889); State ex rel. White v. Barker, 116
Iowa 96, 89 N.W. 204 (1902).
8 The first two categories are too familiar to call for documentation. As to the
third, see Colo. Const. art. V, § 35; Pa. Const. art. III, § 20.
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sentative hands and having the representatives of the people as close
to their masters as may be, cannot be pursued with unqualified
fidelity. If the business of government were distributed among a great
number of special function units and conducted by elected officers in
those units, there would be such a melange of constituencies that the
voter's head would swim. It would be highly unrealistic, moreover,
because the extent of governmental service areas changes all the while
and there are interrelationships between different functions. It seems
clear that our general policy over the years to distribute power among
a very limited number of levels of general function units has been a
sound one, even though the size of a unit and the reach of a govern-
mental function or problem do not always coincide.
An illustration with respect to the basic value of equality is in
order. Racial discrimination has carried to the point in Alabama that
the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee have been so redrawn by the
legislature as to exclude a large number of Negro citizens from the
franchise in the City and, thereby, to assure white supremacyY This
is a case of jurisdictional lines being so defined as to subordinate the
basic value of equality to the interest in white supremacy. Conversely,
we find large urban centers in other parts of the country in which
there is a desire in the central city to promote equality in private
housing opportunities, but without the power to act on the subject
beyond the corporate limits."0 Plainly the reach of the human shelter
problem extends throughout the metropolitan area. Under present
conditions the only way governmental action, which would cover the
ground, could be taken would be by state legislation. A public policy
against discrimination in private housing should doubtless be adopted
and enforced at the state level in any event; the basic idea involved
is of general application, although the most serious housing problems
may be confined to the larger urban centers. The situation does
illustrate, however, the difficulty of accomplishing effective decision-
making at the urban community level in matters involving the realiza-
tion of equality.
9 Ala. Act of 1957, p. 185. In a suit by negroes affected by the act to have it
declared violative of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the United States Court
of Appeals rejected the constitutional claim in the absence of racial discrimination
appearing on the face of the statute. Gomiflion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1959). The Supreme Court has granted review. 28 Law Week 3269 (March 22, 1960).
10 This problem is currently being confronted in Philadelphia, following failure of
proponents to obtain enactment of state legislation at the 1959 regular session of the
General Assembly. Pittsburgh earlier enacted a fair housing practices ordinance, following
the lead of New York City.
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STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS
In the state configuration the ultimate repository of political
power is the electorate. In an Austinian sense, the state constitution
is an organic law expressing the will of the electorate. If the constitu-
tion is written along simple organic lines with a minimum of detail,
it does not involve direct decision-making in the sense with which we
are concerned. It does draw lines of jurisdiction-that is, it makes a
basic division of governmental authority. If the constitution departs
from the organic concept and deals with specific subjects as by a provi-
sion dedicating particular public revenues to particular public pur-
poses, it is entering the realm with which we are concerned and it may
be affecting decision-making in the urban context.
It is necessary to distinguish between a primary division of power
or jurisdiction and decision-making within the framework of that
division. There has been noteworthy confusion in this respect as to
local autonomy. The advocates of substantive constitutional home
rule for municipalities have insisted upon a constitutional division of
power as between the state and the indicated local units. This has
resulted in constitutional home rule states providing more than local
autonomy: it has involved some measure of political self-determina-
tion. It is entirely possible that adequate authority and responsibility
for decision-making as to urban life can be granted to government at
the local level without making a fixed constitutional division of power.
Broad authority can be devolved upon local government subject to
the ultimate authority of the legislature to deny or restrict."
At the present time there is no conception of home rule as broad
as a metropolitan region; we have not been thinking of home rule in
terms of an as yet undeveloped metropolitan jurisdiction. The home
rule situation in Ohio, for example, is a fragmented affair.'" A primary
city and each of the peripheral or enclaved municipalities in that
urban area has home rule powers in its own right.13
Constitutional home rule for a general-function metropolitan
government would make a division of power that would render the
position of the central government of the state less important. Carried
far enough, it would greatly depreciate the position of the state gov-
ernment. This very point leads to consideration of a central problem
in the area of this discussion.
11 See American Municipal Association, "Model Constitutional Provisions for
Municipal Home Rule" 19 et seq. (1953).
12 Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3 makes a direct grant to each municipality (village
or city) of all powers of local self-government. See the symposium on "Home Rule in
Ohio," 9 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1948).
13 Thus, the City of Columbus, the adjoining City of Upper Arlington and the
enclaved City of Bexley all have home rule powers.
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RELATIVE WEAKNESS OF THE STATE
It is obvious that an American state lacks both the cohesive ele-
ments of a national state associated with its independent stature in
the international realm and the social, cultural and economic elements
of the community which are likely to characterize an urban area. In
other words, in a community sense, a state is a pretty artificial con-
figuration. Even so, it would not be accurate to say that there is no
state sense of community. An element of commonness has become a
part of the state scheme of things through tradition and a long experi-
ence of sharing within the state framework. This is a fact of American
society. When it is viewed along with the strongly vested political
position of the states, the possibility that we might work out deliber-
ately a better conceived division of the country into states is too slight
to command our attention, no matter how pleasant the intellectual
exercise.
What we are brought to is the question whether state govern-
mental institutions and processes can be improved and strengthened to
the point that the states will perform a significant role in the total
conduct of human affairs. Certainly their governmental responsibili-
ties within the federal framework are still very large with respect to
a host of matters. These embrace the enactment and the administra-
tion of most of our private law as well as the basic system of criminal
law. They comprehend public education, welfare services, highway
and other elements of the circulatory system, and the system of local
government.
We are at a stage at which it is a matter of first-rank importance
in our system that the position of the state government be reexamined
with a view to the action needed to gird them for their tasks, with
particular reference to urban life and decision-making in that area.
The state legislature is, in most states, clearly not now equal to the
task of providing the needed governmental arrangements and flexibility
of action demanded by the rapid development of metropolitan life. It
is a part-time organ, with representation weighted against the urban
centers, with a weak, understaffed committee system and antiquated
procedures for policy-making. Nor is there encouraging concern about
this situation. On the contrary, those of us who are pressing this
point find it necessary to be pretty tough-minded and persistent to
continue in the face of such overwhelming lack of interest.
There is the crucial area of fiscal powers in which the states,
resting on limited geographical areas in a national economy, are at a
distinct disadvantage as compared with the national government. How
can the states maintain enough financial independence to prevent
federal policy-dictation through the leverage of the purse? A partial
1960]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
answer is that they can remove self-imposed restrictions. Consider
the posture of Pennsylvania. The state constitution, as narrowly
interpreted by the state supreme court, does not permit graduated
income or succession taxes, nor even of personal exemptions and
deductions for dependents under state or local flat-rate income taxes. 4
The state's residents may be subjected to foreign income taxes on what
they earn in other states or on income from property in other states,
but Pennsylvania enjoys no reciprocal benefits. Nor, of course, does
it take advantage of the fact that state income-tax payments are
deductible in the computation of the federal income tax.
A basic step in the girding of the states for an important role is
state constitutional revision. The Kestnbaum Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations made the point effectively in its report to
the President in June, 1955.1 The central problems are to provide
strength and flexibility of action by removing the self-imposed
shackles that abound in state constitutions and strengthening key
institutions and processes, notably the legislative.' 6
AREAL DIVISION OF POWER
Some local decision-making is directed to the very division of
power on an areal basis. So it is with annexation. In the case of a
middle-sized city, not ringed by small municipalities, annexation may
be a direct means of conforming municipal jurisdiction to the actual
urban area. If the consent of voters or property owners in an area
sought to be annexed is required by law, the power of decision is
placed in their hands. Such a policy is embraced by the constitution
of New York as to city annexation 17 and the Temporary Commission
on the Revision and Simplification of the Constitution is not recom-
mending that it be modified.' 8 This is not a defensible policy even at
the legislative level. To give it constitutional status is worse. The
question is one of jurisdiction with the final word being left to only
part of the people affected. Those people do not act, moreover, as an
organized constituency; they speak as individuals. There is no plan
or form to their participation in the decision. On the other hand, to
14 Butcher v. City of Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A.2d 298 (1938). Pa. Const.
art. IX, § 1, provides that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects,
within the limits of the territorial authority levying the tax .. " In contrast, the Ohio
uniformity clause applies simply to ad valorem taxes. Ohio Const. art. XII, § 2.
15 Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Report to the President for
Transmittal to the Congress 56 (1955).
16 Fordham, "The State Legislative Institution" passim (1959).
37 N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 14.
Is The Temporary Commission on the Revision and Simplification of the Con-
stitution, First Steps Toward A Modern Constitution 16, 17 (Leg. Doc. No. 58, 1959).
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give the municipality seeking to annex the controlling voice would
amount to enabling it to achieve unilaterally an extension of its
jurisdiction.'
State policy can meet the problem by recognizing at the outset
that local autonomy in conducting governmental affairs is one thing
while the drawing of jurisdictional lines is another. Pursuing this, the
annexation statute both embraces substantive standards governing
annexation and places their application in the hands of a governmental
authority independent of the municipality, the people and the area
affected. The well-known Virginia plan employs the judiciary as the
independent agency. 20  Alaska2 and Minnesota22 have rested the
responsibility upon state administrative bodies. This is a development
which excites interest. It is calculated to provide an agency and a
process for taking both the larger and the more particular community
interests into account.
The same can be said with respect to the creation of new local
jurisdictions. One of the difficulties which plague us in the organiza-
tion of urban life is the ease with which new municipalities may be
erected in the urban fringe.3 Old statutes in many states, Ohio
included, 4 have little policy content and do not give heed to the rela-
tion of a proposed new incorporation to the interests and structure of
the larger community.
NATIONAL POWER
There are three aspects of national power which are likely to have
an increasingly important bearing upon the American urban scene.
Congress has a number of primary powers which are applicable. They
include the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the
power to provide for the common defense, the postal power and the
19 This is the Texas policy as to home rule cities. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1175
(Vernon, 1953).
20 Va. Code § 15-152.2 et seq. (1950).
21 Alaska Const. art. X, § 12.
"A local boundary commission or board shall be established by law in the executive
branch of the state government. The Commission or board may consider any proposed
local government boundary change. It may present proposed changes to the legislature
during the first ten days of any regular session. The change shall become effective
forty-five days after presentation or at the end of the session, whichever is earlier,
unless disapproved by a resolution concurred in by a majority of the members of each
house. The commission or board, subject to law, may establish procedures whereby
boundaries may be adjusted by local action."
22 Minn. Laws of 1959, c. 686.
23 Mandelker, "Standards for Municipal Incorporations in the Urban Fringe," 36
Te. L. Rev. 271 (1958).
24 See Fordham and Dwyer, "Municipal Incorporation and Territorial Changes in
Ohio," 13 Ohio St. L.J. 503 (1952).
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banking and currency powers. The independent exercise of these
powers condition decision-making at the state and local levels. Sec-
ondly, the spending power affords great leverage. In the third place,
interstate cooperation as to urban affairs is increasingly important as
urbanization reaches over state lines and interstate compacts are
subject to Congressional approval.
The first two categories are pretty familiar stuff. There is an
awareness that they are enough to give the central government of the
nation a dominant role in the further attack upon urban problems,
unless the states seize the day as already suggested. We cannot expect.
a void; if the states do not respond to urban questions the national
government eventually will.
The implications of federal power under the compact clause are
less familiar ground. The potential of the interstate compact as a
means of achieving sound governmental arrangements in a multi-state
urban area has hardly been scratched. It has been used not a little on
an ad hoc basis to provide a type of special function overlay of gov-
ernment, but key questions as to responsiveness to the popular will
have not been answered.2 5 A current proposal for the creation of a
national capital transit authority for the District of Columbia metro-
politan area, contemplates that the federal unit would be supplanted
in time by an interstate agency, established by a District of Columbia-
Maryland-Virginia compact. The question of local participation in
the control of the agency has been noted but left open.26
Congress can attach conditions to its consent to an interstate
compact.27 It can exact federal participation in an interstate govern-
mental arrangement established by compact. 8 It probably can
revoke its consent even where the power to do so has not been expressly
reserved.29 Thus, federal influence as to compacts can be great. Given
25 Representative .Celler has introduced H.J. Res. 615 in the second session of the
86th Congress with the object of so amending the broad consent of Congress to the
New York Port Authority Compact as to require submission of all future compact
amendments to Congress and require reporting and disclosure to Congress about
Authority operations. A New York Times editorial of March 28, 1960, criticized him for
attacking home rule in the New York port area but it expressed no concern about
popular participation other than through the state legislatures and the governors.
26 106 Cong. Rec. 4971 et seq. (daily ed. March 14, 1960).
27 This must be evident as to any condition which does not go beyond what
Congress could exact directly by exercise of another constitutional power.
28 In the case of the important Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, for
example, it is provided that the United States, as well as each participating state, shall
have three representatives on the interstate commission. 54 Stat. 752 (1940).
29 The writer cannot point to judicial authority here. He notes that the action of
Congress in consenting to a compact is political and not contractual, that the contract
clause does not apply to the United States in any event and that Congress could
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vigorous state government, there is basis for the expectation that the
national government would be working with participating states on a
basis of cooperation rather than dictation in the development of multi-
state metropolitan governmental arrangements by compact.
EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL POWER
Extra-governmental political power is a major force in urban
decision-making. At the state level it bears on the legislative attitude
as to local structure and powers. If in a bicameral legislature one
major party, which is largely rural, small-town and suburban in its
representation, controls one house and the big city party controls the
other, it is likely to take some sort of political bargain to get some-
thing that is desired by the large cities. Legislative decisions are
commonly made by party caucus, not through the process of debate
and deliberation."
On the local scene the real decision-making may take place out-
side the formal governmental framework if the party voice is strong
enough. And where intergovernmental cooperation is called for as to
a matter affecting a number of local units a veto by one political boss
may result in a negative decision.
These forces cannot be fully taken into account and evaluated
without identification and adequate information. But they do not
operate altogether in broad daylight. What this means is that it is diffi-
cult to reckon with them deliberately in community decision-making.
Even if they are brought into the open, the moral sense of the com-
munity may not be strong enough to have the quality and effect of
strong sunlight. Regulation of political activity can be flouted as can
laws against extortion and bribery. Vigorous political opposition, like
cross-examination in the judicial forum, is a likely check.
The more complex the urban community and the more diffuse the
distribution of extra-governmental political power, the more difficult
the problem of making effective decisions of metropolitan applica-
tion. This, in short, is roughly what one might say as to the govern-
mental situation.
PRIVATE POWER STRUCTURE
We are generally conscious of a so-called private power structure
in community life. In some communities, even of large size, it may
be readily identifiable.3 ' A sizeable urban community may be largely
hardly, by consenting to a compact, be said to have restricted any of its other constitu-
tional powers.
30 This is a commonplace feature of the legislative process in Pennsylvania, for
example.
31 A few powerful business and financial figures have been central to the tremendous
development that has been taking place in downtown Pittsburgh.
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dominated by one individual. More commonly, the situation is much
more complex than this. In a major urban center one is likely to find
a number of non-profit civic and welfare organizations of standing and
some influence as well as powerful business leaders who can bring
great weight to bear on questions of importance to them. There is, of
course, no official or other established means of regularizing private
activities directed to local decision-making. They, like political
activities, are not fully in public view and they are difficult to assess.
They must be reckoned with, however, as live elements in the total
complex.
CONCLUSION
It has not been the object of this paper to press for the establish-
ment of metropolitan units of government which are general function
in character. It may be that the Toronto approach, which gives effect
to the idea that a metropolitan government should have jurisdiction
over public affairs of a metropolitan sweep, will be embraced in a
number of American metropolitan areas.32 The writer is disposed to
think that in time we shall be forced to resort to some kind of overlay
of government which will provide the framework and the process for
decision-making and administration on an area-wide basis. Meanwhile,
there is room for a deal of research in the actualities of decision-
making of metropolitan significance. Data and insights as to the "is"
should assist us in reaching conclusions as to the "ought." Meanwhile,
too, the division of powers and jurisdiction is so fragmented, both
vertically and horizontally, that intergovernmental cooperation is indis-
pensible in decision-making. This bespeaks efforts to encourage and
facilitate communication and cooperative action on matters of common
concern.
32 For a description and evaluation of the Toronto development, see Milner, "The
Metropolitan Toronto Plan," 105 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 570 (1959).
